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"exigent circumstances" that would allow warrantless searches of cars
in police custody where such exigent circumstances were present at the
time of the initial seizure. However, the police should continue to
exercise care and caution and obtain a search warrant (as did the police
in the Skinner case), both for their own benefit in suppression hearings,
and for the protection of a defendant under the fourth amendment.
Frederick S. Lipton
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE-
SUNDAY BLUE LAWS HELD CONSTITUTIONAL. Giant of Maryland
v. State's Attorney for Prince George's County, _ Md. _, 298 A. 2d
427 (1973).
In Giant of Maryland v. State's Attorney for Prince George's
County' the Maryland Court of Appeals held that, in accordance with
Article 27, § 534H2 of the Maryland Code, a retail establishment may
not remain open on Sunday if, at any time in the course of its weekday
operating scheme, it employs more than six persons per shift.'
1. - Md __, 298 A.2d 427 (1973). Safeway Stores, Incorporated and the Grand Union Com-
pany were enjoined from operating on Sunday by identical petitions brought by the Prince
George's State's Attorney in the Court of Appeals of Maryland No. 149, September Term.
The appeals were separately argued, but the court chose to consolidate both into one opin-
ion because of their similarity of issues.
2. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 534H (1971). Insofar as pertinent to the issues presented in
Giant, this article provides:
(a) In Prince George's County, except as specifically in this section otherwise
provided, it is unlawful on Sunday for any wholesale or retail establishment to con-
duct business for labor or profit in the usual manner and location or to operate its
establishment in any manner for the general public. It shall not cause, direct, per-
mit, or authorize any employee or agent to engage in or conduct business on its be-
half on Sunday.
(b) Notwithstanding any provision of this section, the operation of any of the
following types of retail establishment is allowed on Sunday.
1. Drugstores whose principal business is the sale of drugs and related items.
2. Delicatessens whose principal business is the sale of delicatessens and re-
lated food items.
3. Bakeries and bakeshops.
(c) Nothing in this section applies to:
3. Small business with not more than six (6) persons on any shift with the ex-
ception of persons or retailers engaged in the sale of motor vehicles.
The statute further authorizes the Circuit Court to enjoin violation of this section and
provides for misdemeanor penalties of one thousand dollars per employee directed to
operate in violation thereof.
3. The Blue Laws of Maryland are found in MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 492-534M. Section
534H, which governs Sunday sales in Prince George's County, is similar to those sections
operative in Montgomery (id. § 534J), Baltimore (id. § 534L), Harford and Wicomico (id.
§ 534M) Counties. Section 534J is identical except that it contains the word "basic" in
subsection (b)(1), while § 534H(b)(1) uses the word "principal". Section 534L is nearly
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On June 4th, 1972, Giant, which had previously operated its
Maryland stores on a six-day schedule, followed the lead of competitor
Safeway 4 and began Sunday sales.' In so doing, Giant interpreted the
Prince George's County Blue Law as allowing unlimited staffing in the
bakeshop, delicatessen, and drug departments of its supermarket
stores,6 and additionally, as permitting staffing with six or less
employees per shift in the remaining sections of its supermarket. In
response to Giant's Sunday opening, the Prince Georgq's County State's
Attorney filed a criminal action to enjoin Giant from dealing on
Sundays.' The Circuit Court held Giant in violation of the law, and
ordered it to cease and desist its Sunday operations,8 despite Giant's
contention that it met the bakery-delicatessen-drug store exception.
While the appeal was pending, Giant's retail establishments in Prince
George's County remained open on Sunday, using special shifts of six
or less persons.' On January 2, 1973, the Court of Appeals held that
only those businesses which regularly operate with six or less employees
on any shift during the week may lawfully open their doors on
Sundays. ' 0
Giant contended' ' that the Prince George's County Blue Law: (1) is
unconstitutional under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, pursuant to the void-for-vagueness rule;' 2 (2) denies Giant
equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment; and (3)
exempts specific departments of Giant's stores from sanctions
identical to § 534H, with the exception that § 534L(c)(3) places a three employee shift lim-
itation instead of six employees and that the penalties under § 534L are less stringent. Sec-
tion 534M(c)(3) differs only in using a two employee limitation and less stringent penalties.
4. Brief of Appellee at 2, app. 1, Giant of Maryland, Inc. v. State's Attorney for Prince
George's County, - Md. -, 298 A.2d 427 (1973).
5. Brief for Appellant, at E.41, Giant of Maryland, Inc. v. State's Attorney for Prince
George's County, - Md. -, 298 A.2d 427 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant];
The Washington Post, June 3, 1972, § B, at 9, col. 3.
6. Id.
7. Brief for Appellant at E.5.
8. Brief for Appellant at E.7. In the concurrent Safeway and Grand Union opinion, the lower
court did not enjoin the operations of those stores as they had been operating with less
than six employees at "any given time on Sunday."
9. The lower court's interpretation "of any one shift" to mean "any given time on Sunday,"
specifically permitted Giant's opening as well as instigated the proliferation of store open-
ings on Sunday throughout the 1972 Christmas Season.
10. - Md. __, 298 A.2d 427 (1973).
11. Giant made no "contention" that Maryland's Sunday Blue Laws violated the first amend-
ment prohibition against establishment of religion because of an invalid religious purpose
contravening the well established guideline in McGowan v. Maryland 366 U.S. 420 (1961),
affg 220 Md. 117, 151 A.2d 156 (1957). In McGowan, the Supreme Court outlined the
present-day motivation for Blue Laws and stated that, "the state's purpose is not merely
to provide a one-day-in-seven work stoppage. In addition to this, the State seeks to set one
day apart from all others as a day of rest, repose, recreation and tranquility .. " Id. at
450.
12. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926). See also Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507 (1948); U.S. v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S.
445 (1927); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S.
500 (1926).
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(bakeshops, delicatessens and drug stores are statutorily permitted to
remain open on Sundays' 3 ).
It has been well established by the Supreme Court that a state statute
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so'
equivocal that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to
its meaning and application is unconstitutional as void for uncertainty,
and thereby violating the due process clause.1 4 Most recently, Mr.
Justice Marshall outlined the constitutional objections to vague laws:
It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void
for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague
laws offend several important values. First, because we assume
that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct,
we must insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence
a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he
may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not
providing fair warning. Secondly, if arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit
standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly
delegates basic policy matter to policemen, judges, and juries
for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the
attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory applica-
tion.' s
Specifically, Giant asserted that the terms "small business" and "on
any one shift" as used in § 534H were so vague, uncertain and
unsusceptible of definition as to fail to inform retail operators of those
acts which would render them subject to criminal penalties.'6 The
Court of Appeals, while admitting that the statute in question was not a
model of legislative precision, held that no constitutional right of due
process is violated by an imprecise enactment.' '
Giant further asserted that a law which imposed an economic penalty
on stores whose operating schemes demand that more than six persons
be employed therein, while imposing no penalty on stores in direct
competition with the penalized stores, constituted a denial of equal
protection.' Such an equal protection argument was made to the
13. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 534H(b) (1971).
14. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); Annot., 70 L. Ed. 322
(1927).
15. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
16. Brief for Appellant at 12.
17. The court stated its belief that more specific language could have been used by the Mary-
land Legislature, and offered the statutory language considered in Opinion of the Justices,
159 Me. 410, 191 A.2d 637 (1963) and City of Bismarck, 177 N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 1970) as a
model of their interpretation.
18. Although Giant also raised an equal protection argument based on whether the six em-
ployee limitation was an unreasonable classification, it was not pressed in the appeal. The
court summarily dismissed this argument relying on McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961). Giant of Maryland v. State's Attorney for Prince George's County, - Md. - 298
A.2d 427, 436 (1973). It has been held that arbitrary statutory classifications are not viola-
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Maryland Court of Appeals one year earlier in Rebe v. State's Attorney
for Prince George's County,' 9 where two department stores asserted
that the unhampered sale in a drugstore of certain goods which they
were prohibited from selling indicated a denial of equal protection. In
rejecting this contention, the Rebe court said:
Since it appears to us that there was ample justification for
the legislative determination that tranquility and repose would
be more likely assured if small business establishments operated
on Sundays, while large ones did not, we find nothing arbitrary
or discriminatory in the classification, nor do we think the
classification rests, in the language of McGowan, "on grounds
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the state's objective."
'2 0
With regard to Giant's second contention, i.e. that under the
exemption clause the bakeshops, delicatessens, and drug departments in
its supermarkets are exempt from prosecution under section 534H,
Giant argued that, as their bake-goods subsidiary, Heidi, is in direct
competition with bakeshops which are allowed to remain open on
Sundays, its bake-goods business is severely restricted and economically
penalized merely because it chose for'its place of business the interior
of a non-exempt grocery store. Giant also advanced the logic of this
contention with respect to its delicatessen and drug sectors. However,
both the Circuit Court and Court of Appeals rejected this claim to
exemption, reasoning that, since all of the excluded departments'
employees are engaged, managed, and paid by Giant, the structure
constitutes a single entity incapable of separation for purposes of Blue
Law exclusion.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals reflects its reluctance to declare
an act of its legislature constitutionally deficient, 2 ' but herein lies its
greatest fault: it fails to deal adequately with patent evidence of
statutory vagueness. As the issue progressed through the channels of
tions per se of the equal protection clause. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970):
In the area of economics-and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imper-
fect. If the classification has some "reasonable basis," it does not offend the Consti-
tution simply because the classification "is not made with mathematical nicety or
because in practice it results in some inequality." "The problems of government are
practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accomodations-illog-
ical, it may be, and unscientific." "A statutory discrimination will not be set aside
if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."
Id. at 485 (citations omitted).
19. Rebe v. Prince George's State's Attorney, 262 Md. 350, 277 A.2d 616 (1971).
20. Id. at 358, 277 A.2d at 619-20. Although Giant strenuously questioned what specific "ample
justification" existed in the legislature's despotic determination that six employees per
shift is the level of chaotic infraction of the day of rest that communities could not endure,
the Court of Appeals decision failed to answer their query.
21. After a thorough review of the decisions of Maryland courts, the writer notes a special re-
luctance of the Maryland courts to declare acts of the Maryland Legislature void for vague-
ness. See, e.g., Lashley v. State, 10 Md. App. 136, 142, 268 A.2d 502, 506 (1970); Hunt v.
Montgomery County, 248 Md. 403, 414, 237 A.2d 35 (1958).
19731
Baltimore Law Review
justice, no less than five men of certainly more than common
intelligence, including four public officials2 2 (or bodies) and the
defendant,2 offered no less than five different interpretations as to the
applicability of the penalties to the defendant. A criminal statute which
frustrates a good faith attempt by a defendant to determine the
criminality of his conduct and conform to the letter of the law violates
the constitutional guarantee of due process.
Paradoxically, the Court of Appeals took notice 2 4 of this divergence
of opinion, but, after offering a reflexive recitation of the man of
"common intelligence" standard as the method of determining whether
the statute is void for vagueness, brought forth yet another enlightened
interpretation of the statute. s
Another patent inconsistency also exists in the Court of Appeals'
decision. The court construed the legislative intent to be contrary to
allowing Giant's multi-million dollar business to remain open on the
designated day of rest, yet by its construction it permits the billion
dollar Southland Corporation, through its fifty-seven 7-Eleven
Stores,2 6 to operate in the county unrestricted by the calendar. As a
product of this construction, the single entity of the Southland
Corporation in Prince George's County derives an unwarranted bonanza
from permitted Sunday sales, despite the fact that its operation violates
this construed legistative intent.
To establish a cause of action under the equal protection clause, the
statute in question must create an arbitrary classification that disregards
any valid public purpose.2 7 The arbitrary nature of § 534H is shown
by the fact that it is directed punitively at larger stores, while creating a
comparative bonanza for those of smaller physical dimensions. It is not
22. Opinions as to the interpretation of the law, and the applicability to defendant were of-
fered by Circuit Court Judge James H. Taylor, Brief for Appellant at E.49; Montgomery
County Executive James Gleason, Brief for Appellant at E.34; The State's Attorney for
Montgomery County, Brief for Appellant at E.30; as well as the Court of Appeal's interpre-
tation.
23. Amicus curiae briefs were offered in support of the Prince George's County State's At-
torney by Montgomery County and by Safeway Stores and S. S. Kresge Company in sup-
port of Giant's contentions.
24. - Md. -, 298 A.2d 427 (1973).
25. In effect, by proposing that the definition of "any one shift" includes "any regular shift,"
the court was stating that they alone were men of common intelligence, and, in so doing,
established as a point of law that the lower court judge, the State's Attorney, and a neigh-
boring county executive, as well as the defendant, were men incapable of formulating a
reasonable interpretation. In so doing, the Court of Appeals has summarily enlarged an act
under the guise of judicial interpretation. The Supreme Court has condemned such action
by state tribunals in saying, "judicial enlargement of a Criminal Act by interpretation is at
war with the fundamental concept of the common law that crimes must be defined with ap-
propriate definiteness." Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306, 311 (1914). In United States
v. Weitzel, 246 U.S. 533 (1918), Mr. Justice Brandeis warned of such an enlargement:
"Statutes creating and defining crimes are not to be extended by intendment because
the court thinks the legislature should have made them more comprehensive." Id. at 543.
26. Brief for Appellant at E.24.
27. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971); McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
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beyond contemplation that a food store exist 2 8 which sells the same
products as Giant, in the same square footage, with the same
supermarket atmosphere, but which, because of a different operating
scheme, is able to employ six or less employees per shift on a regular
basis. In effect, this constitutes invidious discrimination within a class.
While previous Maryland holdings have granted the legislature a wide
latitude in classifying commodities and businesses for Sunday closing
statutes, it would be a fundamental denial of equal protection if an
ordinance is allowed to stand which invidiously discriminates between
those in the same business who properly belong in the same class.2 9
The attempt by the Court of Appeals to claim the Rebe decision to
be stare decisis of the equal protection argument is faulty in its failure
to recognize a significant distinction between the two cases: Rebe
asserted discrimination along product lines, while Giant asserted
discrimination between merchants of the same trade.
Paragraph B of the Prince George's County Blue Law excludes some
specified sellers of goods of necessity from Sunday commerce prosecu-
tion, including drug stores whose principal business is the sale of drugs
and related items, delicatessens whose principal business is the sale of
delicatessen and related food items, and bakeries and bakeshops. In
considering whether a department store section may remain open on
Sunday, the Supreme Court of Maine, under a statute similar to that of
Prince George's County, allowed departments to remain open if they
were in direct competititon with the stores permitted by statutory
exception. The court stated:
[T] he department store is not penalized for its size. It is not
forced to close because some of its business taken alone would
not be non-exempt or because the store as a whole does not
come within the fair meaning of any category described in the
statute. The department store may thus compete on Sundays
with the exempt store; but not with the closed store ....30
Applying the logic of the Maine decision to the Giant problem it
would follow that Giant could compete, without a bar on the number
of employees, with allowed drug, delicatessen, and bake-goods stores by
keeping the corresponding areas of its markets open on Sunday. In the
remaining areas, the department stores would be expected to comply
with the requirement of only six employees per shift, and could
therefore fairly compete with previously exempted businesses. This
28. Consumer Supermarkets and Jumbo Food Stores would meet this contemplation. See
Brief for Appellant at E.24.
29. West v. Winnsboro, 252 La. 605, 211 So. 2d 665, 672 (1968). See also 16 AM. JUR. 2d, Con-
stitutional Law § 503, at 881-82 (1964).




logic would further the purpose of the exemption, i.e. to provide the
consumer with the necessities of life on Sunday, without arbitrarily
designating only the "Ma and Pa" corner store as the sole source of
supply.
Presently, the requirement that consumers purchase their Sunday
necessities at the corner shop creates "an economic state in which the
complaining store's competitors, selling identical products at higher
prices, will gain an advantage at the ultimate expense of the
consumer."3 I The Court of Appeals' ruling forces the consumer to pay
the higher prices3 2 of the neighborhood convenience stores by denying
him the "discount" shopping of the supermarkets, and, in so doing,
disregards the public welfare.
The Prince George's County Blue Law is antiquated, unjust, and
legally incomprehensible. The terminology employed in the statute no
longer operates in the medium intended by the legislature. For
example, the term "drug store" has long since been unsusceptible of
definition. The Court of Appeals was quick to assert that, as seventy-
five per cent of Giant's sales are derived from food 3 3 and food-related
products, it did not qualify as a drug store. However, the modern drug
store is but a misnamed departmentalized shopping mecca whose trade
thrives on everything from pencils to paperbacks. One prominent drug
chain, whose advertising proudly claims it to be much more than a drug
store, remains faithful to this assertion by earning seventy-eight per
cent of its income from non-drug products.3 4 Yet the "drug stores"
bustle in the shadow of Giant's Sunday silence.
Even disregarding these inequities of legal application, it remains
apparent that the Prince George's County Blue Law runs against the
grain of the most fundamental constitutional guidelines as to
prohibitory sanctions.3 " For this reason, Article 27, § 534H should be
renounced and repealed forthwith.3 6
Steven H. Oram
31. Letter from Joseph B. Danzansky, President of Giant of Maryland, Inc.; John Bell, Vice
President, Safeway Stores, Inc.; John Hechinger, President Hechinger Company; and
Earl R. Halterman, Jr., President, Scott's Corporation to the Honorable Margaret E.
Schweinhaut, Chairman, Montgomery County Senate Delegation, January 19, 1973, on file
with the University of Baltimore Law Review.
32. The parties stipulated as to the higher prices of convenience stores, e.g., 7-Eleven Stores
and High's Dairy Stores. See, Brief for Appellant at E.27.
33. Brief for Appellant at E.54.
34. Brief for Appellant at E.99.
35. On the question as to whether a citizen may compel enforcement of a Sunday Blue law by
writ of mandamus, see Graham v. Gaither, 140 Md. 330. 117 A 858 (1922).
36. On February 28, 1973, the Prince George's County legislative delegation voted in caucus to
table consideration of bills designed to amend or repeal the County's Blue Law. This ac-
tion will apparently prevent the repeal of or loosening of the Blue Laws during the 1973
Session of the Maryland Legislature. The Washington Post, Mar. 1, 1973, § B, at 13, Col.
2.
